Demographic Change and Public Assistance Expenditures by Robert A. Moffitt
A notable feature of most developed economies in the postwar period has been a
seemingly inexorable growth in expenditures on entitlements.   Although most nations have made
attempts to restrain that growth through legislation, administrative action, and other policy
mechanisms, for the most part these attempts have not met with success.  While there are good
and obvious political reasons for this failure--sometimes the programs have strong constituencies,
for example--the causes of this growth are still not completely understood.
The role of demographic forces in contributing to the growth of social welfare
expenditures in the U.S. is the subject of this paper.  This issue has been the topic of considerable
interest in policy discussions surrounding welfare but little formal analysis.  There is a perception
among the public and in some policy and research circles that the growth of the main cash
program in the U.S., formerly called Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC), has been
the result of an increase in the number of female-headed families, most commonly (in the public
eye) because of increases in the rate of out-of-wedlock childbearing.  Yet this has not been
shown, and economic research on the determinants of participation in welfare programs has
concentrated instead on other factors--for example, the influence of the level of the welfare
benefit relative to private labor market opportunities.   Indeed, most of the economic research
literature on the determinants of AFDC participation examines the determinants of participation in
welfare conditional on demographic status, rather than the impact of demographic influences per
se.
The specific contribution of this paper is to decompose the growth in welfare expenditures2
per capita over the last thirty or so years into three parts: growth in welfare benefits, growth in
the recipiency rate for different demographic groups, and growth in the relative sizes of those
demographic groups.  The first represents the influence of direct expansions in program services
and benefits, while the second represents the influence of the participation rate of the population
in the program.   The third of these components represents the contribution of demographic
forces, and is the main object of interest.
The major programs examined are AFDC, Food Stamps, and Medicaid.   We find that,
over the last thirty years, demographic influences--in particular, growth in female headship rates--
have been by far the most important contributor to trends in real AFDC expenditures per capita,
greatly outweighing changes in benefits and in participation rates.   However, in the short run--
over four-year periods--fluctuations in participation rates have been equally important.   Over the
long run these participation rates have risen and fallen, fluctuating around a fairly unchanging
average level, whereas demographic influences have trended steadily in the direction of greater
caseloads and expenditures.   The analysis also shows that increases in Food Stamp and Medicaid
expenditures have been more influenced by increases in benefit levels and participation rates, on
the other hand, and less by demographic forces, compared to AFDC.
At least for AFDC, the short run and long run demographic influences have been largely
unanticipated by the public sector.   These influences have led to spurts of unanticipated
expenditure growth, which appear to have led in each historical instance to a political reaction and
subsequent retrenchment in the welfare system.   A cycle of short run booms in expenditures,
followed by cutbacks and retrenchment, is revealed in the history of expenditures and benefits
over the last thirty years.   Neither the federal nor the state public sector in the U.S. has done a3
very good job in dealing with these unanticipated fluctuations.
Looking to the future, a natural question is whether demographic forces will continue to
exert a major effect on public assistance caseloads and therefore expenditures.  One immediate
problem with any forecast of public assistance expenditures arises because a major change in the
structure of the welfare system has recently (1996) occurred which makes forecasting both
benefits and participation rates in the system hazardous.    In addition to this problem, however,
population projections of the Census Bureau and the Social Security Administration do not
attempt to project demographic composition at the level of female headship, but only by age, race,
and sex (and occasionally marital status).    Projections of female headship would be, in any case,
difficult given the unsettled state of research on the causes of its secular upward trend.
Nevertheless, because age-race-sex population projections are available, projections of how public
assistance expenditures would change on this basis alone can be conducted.   Such projections are
also provided in the paper.
   The outline of the paper is as follows.  The next section provides a discussion of trends in
social welfare expenditures in the U.S. over the last thirty years and examines whether there is a
prima facie link to trends in demographic composition.  The subsequent section presents the
results of a formal decomposition of the growth in per capita welfare expenditures from 1968 to
1996 in AFDC, Food Stamps, and Medicaid, and shows the importance of demographic change,
particularly for AFDC.   Following this, demographic feedback loops are discussed; then follows
projections of real welfare expenditures arising from future changes in the age, race, and sex
composition of the U.S.  A summary and conclusions ends the paper.1  The set of programs in the expenditure totals excludes unemployment and workmen's
compensation, Social Security, Medicare, and includes only one tax-transfer program (the EITC). 
For the EITC, only the direct credit portion is counted as an expenditure, not the reduction in tax
liability
2   Federal expenditures on welfare programs accounted for 11.0 percent of the federal
budget in 1973 and for 16.9 percent in 1994 (U.S. House of Representatives, 1996, p.1321).
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Trends in Public Assistance Expenditures and Demographic Structure
There are a large number of programs in the U.S. that can, and have been, termed
"welfare" programs.  One of the most authoritative accounts lists over 80 programs which have
some means-tested component and which are nontrivial in size, excluding social insurance
programs like Medicare and Social Security but including tax-based programs like the Earned
Income Tax Credit (Burke, 1995). This makes an accounting for trends in expenditures among the
programs difficult because of the diversity of groups eligible for the programs and the complex
eligibility and benefit rules of most of the smaller ones.  
Nevertheless, clear patterns in expenditure growth emerge when the programs are taken as
a whole and when the major programs are considered.   Figure 1 shows trends in the per capita
real expenditure on the top eighty means-tested benefit programs in the U.S. from 1968 to 1994,
both in absolute terms and as a share of GDP.
1    The most important single point to note in
Figure 1 is that real per capita expenditure on these programs is higher today than it ever has
been, and that there has never been a serious decline in expenditure since 1968.   Therefore,
despite periodic perceptions of retrenchment and cutbacks in means-tested programs, they have
grown secularly.   This is also true of such expenditures as share of GDP, which began at 1.8
percent in 1968 and reached 5.4 percent in 1994.   A large fraction of that share growth has
occurred in expenditures on medical programs, primarily Medicaid.
23  See Moffitt (1998b) for a discussion of the 1996 Act and its political origins and Moffitt
et al. (1998) for a discussion of the causes of the decline of the real benefit decline.  These papers
argue that something more than simple rises in expenditures is needed to explain the political
retrenchment, and that the growth of inequality and reduction in the real incomes and wages at the
bottom of the distribution has played an additional role.   See also Burtless (1994,pp.53-63) for a
discussion of the time-series pattern of real means-tested expenditures and trends in welfare
generosity, and Blank (1997a, pp.85-88) for another discussion.
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The second major feature of Figure 1 to note is the uneven growth of expenditures, for
over the last thirty years there have been two major spurts of growth.  There was an explosion of
welfare spending in the late 1960s and early 1970s and another in the late 1980s and early 1990s;
over the period 1975-1988, however, there was no growth.  This same pattern will appear for
many of the major individual programs as well, such as AFDC, Food Stamps, and Medicaid,
although the magnitudes will differ.
The influence of demographic forces, and alternative explanations for these two periods of
expenditure growth, is the subject of the analysis below and will be discussed in detail.   However,
it is worth noting at this point that each of the booms in expenditure was followed by a significant
political retrenchment in the system.   Following the explosion of expenditures in the late 1960s
and early 1970s, state legislatures let their real AFDC benefits decline steadily, for example.  
Following the explosion of expenditures in the late 1980s and early 1990s, states began reforms
attempting to control caseload growth in the AFDC program and Congress eventually followed
with the most significant contractionary piece of legislation in the history of the program, the
1996 Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act.   A prima facie case can
be made that this pattern of boom and retrenchment can be explained with relatively simple
political models.
3
By 1994, six individual programs constituted 74 percent of total means-tested4 The Medicaid expenditure total in Table 1 includes a large component for the elderly. 
This portion will be subtracted out below.
5  Many of the programs of great analytic interest to the policy evaluation and research
communities are considerably smaller in terms of expenditure.   These include, in descending
order, General Assistance ($9.0 billion including the medical component),  Head Start ($4.1
billion), the Special Supplemental Nutrition Program for Women, Infants and Children, also
known as WIC ($3.3 billion), job training programs including the Job Corps ($2.6 billion), and
energy assistance ($1.7 billion).
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expenditure, as shown in Table 1.   The analysis in the subsequent parts of this paper will
concentrate on three of these programs--Medicaid, Food Stamps, and AFDC.
4   SSI receipt is
concentrated among the elderly and disabled, and demographic effects on its expenditures are
largely driven by increases in the size of the aged and disabled population, which is covered by
papers elsewhere in this conference, and could not be considered without also considering Social
Security and other programs for the aged and disabled.    The EITC is relatively new, at least at
its current scale, and has not yet developed much of a history with which demographic effects can
be assessed, though this may well change in the future.   Section 8 housing assistance, like other
forms of housing assistance, is rationed and hence represents the only non-entitlement program in
the table.   But the consequence of this feature is that expenditures in housing assistance programs
are driven largely by the cost of housing and by programmatic developments, of which there have
been few major ones in the last twenty years.  Thus the influence of demographic forces is less
important for it than for most of the other programs.
5 
The three programs to be analyzed here--AFDC, Medicaid, and Food Stamps--also are
responsible for almost all of the growth in expenditures in the late 1980s and early 1990s.  Total
real expenditures on the entire set of 80+ programs identified by the Congressional Research
Service were $213 billion in FY 1988 and $344 billion in FY 1994, implying an increase of $1316  The Medicaid expenditures in Figure, unlike those in Table 1, pertain only to dependent
children and their adult caretakers.  The elderly and disabled are excluded.
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billion, or a 62 percent growth rate.    Increased spending on medical programs constituted
approximately $80 billion of this increment,  while increases in cash welfare expenditures
contributed $23 billion of new spending and food benefit programs contributed $13 billion,
thereby accounting for almost all of the recent increase in expenditure (Burke, 1995, Table 6).
Expenditure trends in these three programs are illustrated in Figure 2 and the relative
contributions of caseload and benefit growth are shown in Figure 3 and 4, respectively.   As
shown in Figure 2, real per capita AFDC expenditures grew rapidly in the late 1960s and early
1970s, declined significantly from 1975 to 1983, declined slightly more through 1989, and then
rose somewhat in the late 1980s and early 1990s before turning down again.   Thus there have
been no major increases in expenditures in this cash assistance program since the mid-1970s.  
Expenditures in the Food Stamp program, on the other hand, grew all the way until 1980, at
which point they declined for a few years but then rose suddenly in the late 1980s and early 1990s
(but have, like AFDC, recently turned around).   Per capita Medicaid expenditures rose from 1972
to 1978, as the program was still being extended and formed, maintained relative constancy from
the late 1970s to the mid-1980s, and then skyrocketed upward in the late 1980s and early 1990s,
and have only recently peaked.   In fact, Medicaid expenditures now exceed those of AFDC or
Food Stamps.
6    
Thus the two periods of aggregate welfare expenditure growth are reflected fairly well by
these three programs.  Particularly in the late 1960s and early 1970s, expenditures in all three
programs grew rapidly.  For the Food Stamp and Medicaid programs, this is partly a result of7  The Food Stamp program was created by federal legislation in 1964 and the Medicaid
program was created by federal legislation in 1965, but over the subsequent ten years both
programs were only gradually extended to all parts of the country and benefits and services were
only gradually made nationally uniform.
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their newness, for both were still in a formative period.
7  In the late 1980s and early 1990s,
growth in Medicaid expenditures was very strong as was that in Food Stamps, albeit only very
slight for AFDC.  
The long-term trends in expenditure in these three programs also clearly demonstrates
once again the replacement of cash benefits by in-kind transfers in the U.S. social welfare mix.
Working somewhat against this trend has been the growth in SSI benefits and in the EITC, which
are also cash programs.   The growth of the latter suggests that it is not cash per se that the voters
and legislators do not prefer, but rather it is the purpose to which the funds are directed and their
underlying rationale that matters (aged, blind, and disabled for SSI and low-income earners for
EITC).
Figures 3 and 4 decompose these expenditure trends into trends in numbers of recipients
(i.e., the caseload) per capita and real expenditures per recipient, the latter of which is a proxy for
average benefit levels.   The figures show clearly that caseload growth is the primary factor
responsible for expenditure growth, although growth in benefit levels has played some role in the
Medicaid program.   Figure 3 shows that caseload growth patterns in the three programs show the
same pattern of two periods of expansion (late 60s/early 70s and late 80s/early 90s) as aggregate
welfare expenditure, for example.  Even caseloads in the AFDC program grew in the latter boom
period, and the fact that AFDC expenditures did not exhibit the same growth is a result of
continued declines in real AFDC benefits.   Figure 4 shows that benefit trends have not followed8   The rise of in-kind transfers and decline of cash transfers is again reflected in the
caseload figures, for AFDC has been the smallest of these programs since 1972.  It is also
interesting to note that most of the policy developments in AFDC in the last 30 years--the 1967
Social Security Amendments which increased work incentives, the 1981 Omnibus Budget
Reconciliation Act which decreased them and made eligibility more restrictive, the 1988 Family
Support Act which mandated participation in training programs, and a wide variety of state-level
initiatives--appear to have had no major impact on the caseload trends and, therefore, on
expenditure trends. 
9  There are many important details in this definition which we will not take the time to
dwell on here.  The presence of a stepfather does not automatically disqualify the family for
AFDC, nor does the presence of a cohabiting male who is not the natural father of any of the
children.  The AFDC-UP program, on the other hand, makes eligible for benefits children whose
father is present but unmarried to the mother.  See Moffitt, Reville, and Winkler (1994,1998).
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any of those patterns except for a growth in per-recipient Medicaid expenditures in the late 1980s
and early 1990s.  Real AFDC benefits have, in fact, declined over the period as state legislatures
have failed to raise nominal benefit levels enough to keep up with inflation.  Real Food Stamp
benefits have been roughly constant, for those benefits are indexed to inflation by law.
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Demographic Influences.   That the major force behind trends in expenditures has been the
growth in the numbers of recipients rather than expenditures per recipient makes an examination
of the possible role of demographic influences, the main subject of this paper, warranted.  In
considering demographic influences,  it is natural to begin by noting that the most important single
criterion for welfare eligibility historically has been the combination of marital status and
childbearing that leads to female headship, or single-motherhood.   The TANF-AFDC program
has been almost exclusively composed of female-headed families or children in such families,
defined as families in which there is no able-bodied father of the children present.
9  A program
called the AFDC-UP program, which makes children eligible when both mother and father are
present, has never represented more than 7 percent of the caseload.   The Food Stamp program,10  See Blank (1997a) for a more detailed discussion of the rules governing eligibility for
these programs.
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while universally available to low-income families regardless of family structure, has nevertheless
always been disproportionately composed of AFDC-TANF families because Food Stamps are
automatically made available to those families.   The Medicaid program also has always provided
benefits to AFDC-TANF families automatically, but eligibility has been broadened recently to
include children, albeit rarely the adults, in non-welfare families.
10   Welfare participation rates
among female heads will be demonstrated below to still be far above those of other demographic
groups, even for the Food Stamp program.
The main trends in the growth of female-headed families are shown in Figures 5 and 6. 
Figure 5 shows that growth from 1940 to 1994 and demonstrates the now-familiar fact that
female-headship growth accelerated starting in the 1960s and has continued to grow at a fairly
steady pace all the way through the present.   What is somewhat less well-known, but important
for an examination of welfare trends, is that the composition of this growth has changed over
time.  As also shown in Figure 5, divorce rates rose dramatically at about the same time that
female headship rates began increasing, but peaked and leveled off in the late 1970s.  The growth
of female heads since that time has been instead generated by an increase in birth rates among
unmarried women, who tend to be younger and to have higher welfare participation rates.  Figure
6 shows trends in those rates by age and shows a strong increase in the rates for women in the age
range 15-29.    Not only has this latter trend therefore kept the number of female headed  families
growing at a steady pace, it has also induced a change in the composition of the AFDC caseload,
as shown in Figure 7.    In 1942, the program consisted primarily of widows and wives of men11
who had been disabled, but by 1973 the dominant group in the program was divorced and
separated women.   By 1992, however, never married women had assumed the majority position
and the fraction consisting of widowed and divorced women had declined.  These observations
lead naturally to a more formal consideration of the role of demographic factors in caseload
trends.   Together, these figures are suggestive of a prominent role of demographic forces in the
growth of welfare caseloads.
A Demographic Decomposition of Expenditure and Caseload Trends
The goal of this section is to use Current Population Survey (CPS) data to present a
decomposition of the growth of per capita welfare expenditures in AFDC, Food Stamps and
Medicaid between 1968 and 1996 into growth of the relative fractions of different demographic
groups in the population, growth in the welfare participation rate within each demographic group,
and growth in the average expenditure per recipient.  Our main interest is in the first of these in
explaining expenditure growth, but the division between the other two is also of interest.   
Past Work.  Although formal decompositions of caseload growth into growth of the
eligible population and growth in the participation rate conditional on eligibility have been
relatively rare in the research literature on welfare, there have been dozens of studies that have
calculated participation rates per se in different programs, and how they change over time. 
Sometimes demographic and other eligibility factors are examined, and sometimes these are tied
in with growth of the aggregate caseload in informal ways.   For example, the explosion of the
AFDC rolls in the late 1960s and early 1970s received considerable attention, starting with a12
seminal study by Boland (1973) and a follow-up and extension conducted by Michel (1980) , both
of whom found that that explosion was primarily the result of an increase in participation rates
among eligibles, where eligibility was defined not only by having the right family structure
(female-headed family) but also having income below the AFDC eligibility levels.
This conclusion has been generally accepted by subsequent analysts, and the studies just
referenced also sought to explain the rise in participation rates using the conventional economic
model which views participation in welfare as resulting from a tradeoff between the attraction of
benefits from the program, on the one hand, and potential wages off the program, on the other
(the stigma of welfare receipt is also used to explain the failure of some participating eligibles to
be on the program; see Moffitt (1983)).    It was initially thought that the welfare caseload
explosion in the late 1960s and early 1970s could not be explained by the conventional economic
model because AFDC benefits did not rise nor did wages fall over the period.   The increase in the
participation rate was generally ascribed to reductions in stigma and to Supreme Court decisions
outlawing the man-in-the-house rule and residency requirements (Michel, 1980).  However, the
importance of Food Stamps and Medicaid, both of which are heavily tied to AFDC receipt, was
only later recognized.  When the growth of those benefits was considered, a much stronger
argument could be made that it was an attraction of benefits from welfare that played a role in the
increase in the participation rate (Moffitt, 1992, pp.7-8).
Participation rates subsequent to the welfare explosion peaked reached over 90 percent in
the mid-1970s.  Rates have been shown to have subsequently declined over the 1970s and 1980s 
and it has been noted that the growth of the female-head population offset that decline over that
period and kept the caseload growing (Moffitt, 1992, p.8,11).   These declines in participation are11 Blank, as many other authors in this literature, also discuss the AFDC-UP program. All
statements in this section refer only to the AFDC-Basic results.  The AFDC-UP program is
ignored because it is such a small portion of the total caseload.
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more easily explainable by declines in both AFDC benefits and the benefit "sum" obtained by
adding together AFDC, Food Stamp, and Medicaid benefits (Moffitt, 1986, 1992).  Analyses of
the growth in the AFDC caseload over the late 1980s and early 1990s indicate a major role for
demographic factors.  Gabe (1992) concluded that the participation rate remained unchanged
from 1987 to 1991 and that all the increase in the AFDC caseload resulted from an increase in the
numbers of female heads, while the U.S. Congressional Budget Office (1993,p.3) concluded that
one-half the increase from 1989 to 1992 was the result of increases in female headship. Blank
(1997b) conducted a decomposition of the AFDC caseload from 1984 to 1995 in twelve large
states and also concluded that all of the caseload increase is a result of increases in eligibility,
although changes in income were not separated from demographic changes leading to eligibility.
11  
On the other hand, the increase in participation rates in this period have not been successfully
explained.  Blank (1997b) concludes that the growth in the caseload is entirely unexplained by
benefits, wages, and related factors, for example.   Gabe (1992) and the U.S. Congressional
Budget Office (1993), on the other hand, find some role for economic factors in the growth of the
caseload, and for programmatic changes such as the expansion of Medicaid (which could be
thought to draw recipients onto welfare in general).
Studies of the Food Stamp program have also been conducted, where the major interest
has been in calculating participation rates conditional on eligibility to determine how much of the
target population is being served.  In the very early years of the program, in the late 1960s and
early 1970s, essentially all growth was necessarily the result of increases in participation because12  Once again, as in most of these studies, income eligibility and demographic eligibility
are not, however, separated.
13   The purchase requirement was a provision that required recipients to buy Food
Stamps; after its elimination, the stamps were provided free of charge.   The "bonus" value was
unchanged, for the value of the stamps after the change equalled the difference between the value
of the stamps and the purchase amount prior to the change.
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the program was still being put in place and expanded to cover all parts of the country (Ohls and
Beebout, 1993, pp.15-16).  Participation rates among eligibles have grown from 33 percent of
households in 1976 to 67 percent in 1995 (Cody and Trippe, 1997, Table 1).  This growth
dominates the growth of eligibles.  The increase in participation rates occurred mainly in the late
1970s, and in the late 1980s and early 1990s; rates were more or less stable in between.
12   These
studies have generally ascribed the growth in participation in the late 1970s to the elimination of
the purchase requirement.
13   Growth in participation in the late 1980s and early 1990s has been
ascribed to the economy, as well as to Medicaid expansions which were thought to bring families
onto the welfare rolls in all programs, as well as increased access to Food Stamp offices (Cody
and Trippe, 1997, pp.9-10).
As for Medicaid, the dominant factor in most discussions has been increases in
participation.   This is somewhat unusual because, prior to 1984, Medicaid receipt, at least among
women and poor children, was mostly tied to AFDC receipt, and demographic growth has been
thought to have been a significant contributor to the latter.   But subsequent to 1984, eligibility
for Medicaid has been expanded tremendously and decoupled to a significant degree from AFDC,
now covering most poor children and some poor adults (Gruber, 1997).   Participation rates are
quite low, however, around 25-33 percent.   Still, most of the growth of the program in the late
1980s and early 1990s, which has been so important to overall growth of expenditures, has clearly14  Medicaid questions were asked prior to 1989 but the questions were changed in a
major way at that time, to such an extent that many analysts feel the participation rates before and
after the change in questions are noncomparable.
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not been the result of a change in the demographics of the U.S. population.  The Medicaid
program is also the one program among the three examined here which has seen significant
increases in expenditure per recipient, which  are traceable to increases in medical care prices, the
quality of care, and the use of medical technology (see the paper by Cutler and Sheiner in this
volume for discussion of these issues).
New Decompositions.  The analysis presented in this paper uses March CPS data from
1968 to 1996 to provide a more systematic and comprehensive examination of the relative
contributions of demographic factors and participation rate influences to the caseload, and of
expenditures per recipient, as well, to total expenditures.   The AFDC program is examined over
the entire period, but the Food Stamp program is examined only after 1980, and Medicaid only
after 1989, as a result of limitations on when CPS questions on receipt of those benefit types
began.
14   We use answers to CPS questions about receipt of benefits, along with information on
the demographic and economic structure of each household, to conduct the decomposition.
We write expenditures per capita in the population as the sum over population subgroups
k=1,...K of the product of the fraction of the population in that subgroup (wk), the welfare
recipiency rate, or participation rate, in that subgroup (pk), and the average expenditure per
recipient in that subgroup (bk).   Adding year subscripts t, we have
yt      =      3  wktpktbkt (1)16
                              k
where yt is mean expenditure per capita in the population at time t.   Differencing across periods
t and t', we have:
yt  -  yt'       =      3  akt(wkt-wkt')    +      3  bkt(pkt-pkt')    +     3  ckt(bkt-bkt') (2)
                                        k                                     k                                  k
where akt, bkt, and ckt are weights.  The decomposition in (2) can be constructed using six
different sets of weights, which differ according to whether the sums are evaluated at the period t
or t' values of the other variables, which yields six different estimates of the relative importance of
the the three factors.  This is a necessary consequence of the nonlinearity of the relationship. 
Rather than seek a unique decomposition which relies on an assignment of joint explanatory
power to each of the three factors, here we simply compute and present all six to show the
sensitivity of the weighting to the conclusions.
The most important demographic criteria we use to construct groups are those which15  Only heads less than 60 years of age are included.  Thus all calculations below exclude
the elderly.
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separate households by whether they are female-headed or not, and whether children under 18
reside in the household, both of which are key eligibility criteria for all three programs we
consider.  However, none of the programs excludes other demographic groups entirely from
possible receipt of benefits, especially the Food Stamp program, so we use a relatively
comprehensive definition of eight household types.   These are defined according to whether the
family head is (1) married, (2) female and never married, (3) female and divorced, widowed, or
separated, or (4) male and unmarried; and, secondarily, whether children less than 18 are present
in the household. All four headship types are combined with the two presence-of-children types to
yield the eight household categories.   We also test age of the head as an additional criterion, and
we stratify by race.
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Along with household structure, we also stratify the population by income.  The growth in
individual earnings inequality and family income inequality, and the decline of real wage rates
among less skilled workers in the U.S. in the 1970s and 1980s, make it necessary to control for
changes in income distribution because those changes should also contribute to changes in
participation rates within demographic strata and hence to caseload and expenditure changes.  
We define six economic strata of real nonwelfare income (=total family income minus welfare
income) of the primary family, defined as absolute numbers which are held fixed from 1968 to
1996:  (1) $0, (2) $1-$5,000, (3) $5,001-$10,000, (4) $10,001-$20,000, (5) $20,001-$50,000,
and (6) $50,001 and over.  These brackets were chosen after inspecting welfare participation rates
for different intervals and ascertaining how quickly those rates fall to zero when moving up the16  An alternative procedure would be to hold the income distribution fixed while
conducting the decomposition for demographic influences.  But one would have to pick a
particular income distribution at which to evaluate the demographic effects in that case.  We
should also stress that the participation rates we calculate on the basis of these demographic-
economic groups are not comparable to those calculated in the past literature which attempt to
define eligibility more narrowly by using the actual benefit formulas and rules in each program
together with household economic and other characteristics.  Our participation rates represent a
combination of eligibility and takeup rates conditional on eligibility.
17 The definition of Medicaid "participation" is somewhat ambiguous in the CPS because
the questions asks whether families are "covered" by the program.  In all likelihood, families are
answering the question not by interpreting the question to mean eligibility but rather having used
Medicaid services.  Nevertheless, some families may be answering it the other way.
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income distribution.  Crossing the eight demographic cells with the six income strata yields a total
of forty-eight population cells.
Unlike much of the past literature, our goal here is to isolate demographic influences from
those of income, so we will ascertain the contribution of income influences alone by conducting
the decomposition solely with income.   This assigns all joint influence entirely to economic
factors, and hence will represent an upper bound on the influence of income distribution on the
change in expenditures per capita.
16
Table 2 shows participation rates of U.S. households in the AFDC, Food Stamp, and
Medicaid programs in the mid-1990s, by household type.  The table shows clearly the heavy
participation in all three programs among households with children headed by women who have
never been married.  Almost 50 percent of such households received AFDC income and around
60 percent received Food Stamp and Medicaid benefits.
17   Note that no conditioning on income is
made in the calculation of these participation rates, so it is the entire U.S. population of never-
married female-headed households, at all income levels, that exhibit these high participation rates;
their high levels are an indirect indication of the extremely low income levels of such families.18  Some of the entries in Table 2 with positive participation rates, e.g., those for
households without children receiving AFDC, may seem unusual, but it is possible that someone
else in the household other than the head is eligible for benefits.  Note also that cohabiting couples
are not classified as married in the CPS and may also be eligible for benefits.
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While households headed by divorced, widowed, and separated women also participate in
AFDC at fairly high rates, other demographic groups have much lower participation rates.   But
those other groups are more likely to receive Food Stamps and, sometimes, Medicaid.  Almost
twenty percent of households headed by unmarried males with children received Food Stamps, for
example, and many households without children did so as well.   Medicaid receipt is also high
among several groups for whom AFDC participation is considerably lower.
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Table 3 shows changes in population shares and AFDC participation rates for selected
population subgroups between the late 1960s and the mid 1990s.   Among households headed by
never-married women with children, for example, AFDC participation rates were either
unchanged over the period or rose slightly, as did the participation rates of households headed by
divorced, widowed, or separated women with children.    Their shares in the population rose
tremendously, however, particularly for households headed by never-married women, whose
population shares rose by factors of 6, 7, or 8.  The table also shows the trends in population
shares of a much smaller group, unmarried men with children, whose sizes also rose but by
smaller amounts.   The rise in population shares of the male-headed households are a rough
indicator of the decline of wage rates at the lower part of the skill distribution.
Table 4 shows decompositions of the change in real AFDC expenditure per capita between
the late 1960s and mid-1990s and demonstrates the contribution of demographic influences to that
growth, the main goal of the analysis.   Decompositions are shown for different types of19   We use the same real expenditure per recipient in all cells, which we calibrate to
national expenditures per capita; that is, the average expenditure amount is  calculated by dividing
the participation rate into per capita national expenditure.  There is no attempt to differentiate
benefits levels for different types of recipients.
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weighting, which essentially represent different allocations of the influence of joint contributions
of the three factors to the different components.   In all cases, it is clear that the rise of $14.50 of
real expenditure per capita (see Figure 2) over the period was the result of an increase in the
caseload which outweighed a decline in expenditures per recipient, a rough proxy for benefits.
19  
Moreover, it is also clear that, regardless of the weighting method, the change in population share
was far greater in importance than that of the change in the participation rate.   Thus a prima facie
case for the importance of demographic influences in the long run growth of expenditures is
strongly established by these results.
The last two rows of the table furnish evidence on the degree to which the influence of
population shares reflects changes in the inequality of nonwelfare income rather than changes in
the distribution of household types.   A decomposition which ignores family type altogether
allocates a considerably smaller portion of the total change in expenditure to population shares,
although certainly a nonzero and strongly positive portion.   Decompositions based upon the
change in household type alone are a much more powerful factor in explaining expenditure, up to
twice as important for some forms of weighting.   Thus it is clear that, while downward shifts in
the income were an important contributor to the rise in expenditure, they were less important than
the influence of shifts in the distribution of household types.
Although the primacy of the influence of demographic shifts--mainly the rise in the percent
of unmarried women with children in the population--relative to changes in the takeup rate in20   Each year denoted in the figure represents the midpoint of a four-year interval.  Thus
"1971" represents the pooled years 1969-1972, "1975" represents the pooled years 1973-1976,
and so on.
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AFDC is thus established for the long run, the relative importance of participation rate changes is
considerably more important in the short run.   This is illustrated in Figure 8, which shows the
relative contributions of population shares (the lighter-shaded bars) to that of participation rate
changes (the darker-shaded bars) to per capita AFDC expenditure growth over four-year
periods.
20    That both bars are positive in both the early and late periods reflects the positive
growth of the caseload in the late 1960s and early 1970s, on the one hand, and the late 1980s and
early 1990s, on the other, noted earlier.    That the two bars sum to a much smaller total in the
years in between reflects the relative stability of caseload growth then.   What the figure
demonstrates more importantly is that participation rates have gone through a long-term cycle of
strong growth in the early years, followed by negative growth in the middle period, followed by
positive growth again in the later period.  The net result is participation rates that are somewhat
higher in the mid-1990s than they were in the late 1960s, but not by a large amount. The influence
of population shares, on the other hand, has been more consistently strong and positive
throughout the entire near-thirty-year period.    It was the growth of female-headed households in
the 1970s and early 1980s that kept the caseload from falling in the face of declining participation
rates, for example.   But it is also true that in the two major welfare growth periods, that in the
late 1960s and that in the late 1980s, growth of participation rates was essentially equal in
importance to that of demographic and other population share influences (including declines in
income).   Thus in the relatively short run, participation rate changes are much more important
relative to population share influences than in the long run.   No doubt this is largely a result of22
short-run fluctuations in welfare policy, as well as short-run fluctuations in the economy and in
potential wage rates off welfare relative to benefits available on welfare, which tend to drive
eligibles on and off the rolls.
Table 5 shows long-run decompositions for AFDC expenditure by race, as well as
decompositions for Food Stamps and Medicaid.   Interestingly, major differences appear in the
change in real expenditure per capita on whites and blacks.    While for the white population real
AFDC expenditure per capita has grown by a moderately large amount, such expenditures have
fallen drastically for the black population.   The decline of expenditures on the black population is
a result of the greater participation rates and population shares in welfare-eligible groups in the
black population, for the drastic decline in expenditures per recipient for the black population is a
result of their greater participation rates than those of whites; a greater participation rate (which
implies a greater weight in the decomposition) implies that any given decline in benefit levels has a
much larger impact on aggregate expenditure on the group in question, and hence on national
expenditure per capita.   Compounding the influence of this force has been a decline in
participation rates among the black population, as compared to a increase in participation rates
among whites over the period.
In any case, however, the influence of demographic factors is vastly stronger for the black
population than for the white.  When demographic factors alone are considered (last row of the
table), black demographic shifts exerted a strong positive influence on caseloads and hence on
expenditures.   The influence of income inequality growth, while positive, was much less
important.  For the white population, on the other hand, changes in population shares were, as for
the total population, more important than changes in participation rates in contributing to21  In addition to race, the AFDC decompositions were broken out by the age of the
household head.  Adding age strata to the demographic and income strata changed the relative
importance of population-share and participation-rate influences very little.  This result is largely a
consequence of the strong age correlation of the demographic categories, particularly for never-
married and divorce-widowed-separated, which already capture the major influences of changes in
the age structure over the 1970s and 1980s.   Once these trends are captured, additional age-
related compositional shifts have little additional role to play.
22  As noted earlier, the EPR also exerted upward pressure on Food Stamp participation
rates but the periods shown in the table are largely after the influence of the EPR had worked
itself out.
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expenditure growth, but not nearly so much as for the black population.  These relative
comparisons are consistent with the greater growth of female-headed households over the period
in question in the black population as compared to the white.
21
The last two columns of Table 5 show decompositions for the Food Stamp and Medicaid
programs, for the periods for which CPS data provide consistently-defined measures of household
receipt.    In both cases, the results show a much stronger influence of growth in participation-rate
influences, and smaller influence of population share and demographic influences, than for AFDC. 
 For the Food Stamp program, for example, growth in expenditures per capita from the early
1980s to the mid 1990s was primarily a result of increases in participation rates, and secondarily
of growth in expenditures per recipient; population share influences were third in importance.   
The secular growth of participation rates in the Food Stamp program, referred to earlier, is
consistent with this finding; participation rates have not shown the major, long-run cyclical pattern
as those in AFDC.   This in turn may be a simple result of the fact that real Food Stamp benefits
have not declined, unlike those in the AFDC program.
22  The broader population base and
coverage of the Food Stamp program may, in turn, be responsible for the lesser importance of
demographic factors in contributing to caseload and expenditure growth.23  Feedback loops could also exist in earnings, which are affected by benefit levels
working through labor supply, and in benefit levels themselves, which respond through the
political process to changes in caseloads and expenditures.  Note that if benefit levels respond to
changes in demographics--for example, changes in the number of female heads--through the
political process, then the role of demographics is even larger than what the decompositions in the
last section imply.
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A decomposition for the Medicaid program can only be conducted for the most recent
period, from the late 1980s to the early 1990s.   Expenditures per capita grew strongly during this
period, and the table shows that increases in participation rates among the population groups is by
far the most important contributor to that growth.  This growth largely reflects the expansions of
program eligibility over the period which brought many new non-AFDC population groups into
the program.  Growth in expenditures per recipient is second in importance and changes in the
population share distribution is the least important factor, as in the Food Stamp program.  This is
somewhat more surprising for Medicaid, which is not so universal in eligibility as is Food Stamps,
and may be partly the result of examining only a relatively short time frame over which
demographic factors did not have a chance to change in a major way.
Demographic Feedback Loops
Given the strong long-run influence of demographic factors on expenditure growth, at
least for the AFDC program, it is natural to ask whether there is likely to have been any feedback
from the caseloads, benefit levels, or expenditures of the program to the growth of female-
headedness in the U.S. in the first place.
23   The major source of research evidence on the strength
of the association between AFDC and female-headedness is the rather old and sizable research
literature on this issue.  It is fair to say that the research findings from the literature are quite25
dispersed (see Moffitt, 1992, 1998a; and Hoynes, 1997 for reviews).   There is quite noticable
evidence of welfare effects in cross-sectional data, for female headship rates, out-of-wedlock birth
rates, and other outcomes of relevance are significantly correlated with welfare benefits in cross-
section, and do not appear to go away when other differences (at least at the individual level) are
controlled for.   Models with state fixed effects, which compare changes in female headship rates
across states with different growth rates of benefits, generally find smaller correlations, although
there are exceptions to this generalization as well.   The evidence that is available is consistent
with the existence of a true but weak effect which is difficult to detect amid the myriad other
factors that are affecting demographic behavior of the low-income population--such as the growth
of female wages, the decline of male incomes, and the decline of the male-female sex ratio in some
low-income populations--and which is not robust to changes in specification.   Nevertheless, there
is a rough consensus in the literature that welfare benefits do indeed have a significant effect on
family structure, but that its magnitude is not large, or at least has not been shown convincingly to
be so thus far.
What is less in dispute is that, regardless of the cross-sectional effect of welfare on family
structure, it is difficult to explain the time series increase in female headship and out-of-wedlock
birth rates with welfare benefits.   Figures 5 and 6 showed female headship rates to have grown
steadily, divorce rates to have risen and then flattened out, and out-of-wedlock birth rates to have
jumped in the 1980s.   None of these patterns even roughly coincides with the time series pattern
of AFDC benefits, which have declined secularly at a steady pace.    Of course, other things have
been going on, one of which is a decline in real wage rates at the bottom of the skill distribution,
and this has attenuated the importance of the decline in welfare benefits; nevertheless, wage rates26
have not fallen as much as the benefit, and the benefit-wage ratio has consequently still declined;
so it is difficult to make the argument that, because of the wage decline, welfare has become an
even more attractive option over the last ten or twenty years.  To say that other factors have been
occurring simultaneously as the benefit decline, but which have forced female headship rates
upward, is not to say that benefits have had no effect in time series, but is only to say that female
headship rates might have increased even faster in the absence of that benefit decline.   But it does
imply that the source of the increase in headship rates has to be sought elsewhere.
Another body of relevant evidence is the demographic literature which seeks to determine
whether the increase in female headship is more a result of a decline in marriage rates rather than
an increase in fertility rates (outside of marriage).   That the major force behind the growth of
nonmarital childbearing might be a decline in marriage, and might have little or nothing to do with
fertility, is suggested by the time series trends in fertility which show secularly declining
childbearing rates (for the whole population) for many years, including for women with less
education.  It is quite possible that the rise of nonmarital childbearing is not the result, therefore,
of any increase in overall fertility but rather that an increasing share of a declining volume of births
is occurring outside of marriage because marriage rates themselves have declined.
A decomposition not unlike that conducted above for expenditures can also be conducted
to decompose trends in nonmarital fertility into components due to declines in marriage and rises
in nonmarital fertility (Smith et al., 1996).   Such a decomposition demonstrates that a decline in
marriage rates is indeed the most important single component overall, at least for the period since
1975, and especially for the black population.   An increase in the birth rates of unmarried women,
especially for the white population, has played an important secondary role, however.  These27
decompositions were not conducted for the low-income population per se, and hence are not as
directly relevant to the issues of concern of this paper as they could be.  Nevertheless, they do
suggest that a decline in the return, or gains, to marriage, particularly in the low-income
population, may be an alternative explanation for the rise in female headship rather than the
welfare system or other policy forces.
Projections to 2050
For the purposes of this volume it is useful to ask whether demographic influences in the
future will continue to exert their strong, dominant influence on AFDC expenditures as they have
in the past, and whether those influences will continue to be weak or will grow stronger for the
Food Stamp and Medicaid programs.    Unfortunately, any exercise of this kind must be heavily
qualified because it requires conditioning on fixed participation rates and benefit levels, and there
is considerable reason to think these may differ considerably in the future from what they are now. 
The recent 1996 federal legislation replacing the AFDC program with the TANF program
changed the program in major ways which will, in the short run, reduce expenditures per recipient
and expenditures per capita in major ways.   Whether these reductions will be reversed in the
future or will be permanently reduced is impossible to reliably forecast at the present time.  The
provisions of the legislation also have led to significant reductions in participation rates in TANF,
abetted by a strong economy, introducing further uncertainty into the future course of
participation rates.
A further problematic factor in projections of the influence of demographic factors is the
lack of reliable forecasts of the future course of female-headedness.   Such forecasts would28
require a joint forecast of marital-status and fertility trends which would be extremely tentative
given our rather rudimentary understanding of the structural causes of past trends in female
headship.   Yet because female headship is such a critical element in establishing eligibility for
AFDC, as well as Food Stamps and Medicaid, projections which assume headship rates to be
fixed are especially subject to uncertainty.
With these caveats, however, population projections for the age, race, and sex
composition of the U.S. population furnish a basis for projecting the changes in welfare
expenditures that would result from these basic demographic forces, if nothing else changed. 
Using the CPS to construct population shares for thirty-two age-race-sex demographic groups
(five-year age categories starting at 15-19 and ending at 50-54, plus blacks and whites and men
and women) and AFDC, Food Stamp, and Medicaid participation rates by group and expenditures
per recipient in the mid-1990s, mean expenditures per capita in those years can be computed on
an individual, rather than household, basis.    Holding the participation rates and benefit levels
constant, but changing the population shares to match those in Census Bureau forecasts to 2050
(U.S. Department of Commerce, 1997), yields a projection of the change in real expenditures per
capita.
The results of this exercise for the three transfer programs are shown in Table 6.  As the
table shows, the population share changes forecast by the Census Bureau imply positive, but
relatively small by historical standards, increases in real expenditure.   Inspection of the changes in
population shares from 1995 to 2050 reveals that this growth is almost entirely the result of the
projection of considerably faster growth of the black population than the white.   While the age
distribution of both populations changes slightly--shares at the younger ages grow somewhat, and24  It is important to note that these basic age-race-sex demographic forces have not had
an influence in the past thirty years either.  When only age, race, and sex are used to represent
demographic influences in a decomposition of real AFDC expenditures per capita from the late
1960s to the mid-1990s, the influence of demographics is, in fact, negative.  This is because the
aging of the baby boom cohorts has shifted the age distribution toward middle ages and away
from young ages, where welfare participation rates are the highest.  Thus, just as in the past it has
been the trend in female headship that has been the demographic influence of importance, so it
will be in the future, if demographic influences are to continue to be important.
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shares at the later ages decline (recall that an upper cutoff of age 54 is used, so the growth in the
elderly does not influence these projections), shares of the black population at all ages, young and
old, increase and those of the white population decline.   Given the much higher participation
rates of the black population than the white, even though the gap is narrowing, results in the
increases in expenditure shown in Table 6.   However, as noted previously and as can be seen
visually from Figure 2, the magnitudes of the changes are quite modest by the standard of the
magnitudes of expenditure changes in the programs experienced over the past thirty years.  Thus
is it fair to characterize these projections as showing that basic age-race-sex demographic forces




The analysis in this paper has suggested that trends in real per capita AFDC expenditures
over the last thirty years have been, on net, primarily a result of shifts in demographic influences
rather than of shifts in participation rates conditional on population shares or of average
expenditures per recipient.   While prior work on the welfare growth of the late 1960s and early30
1970s suggested that it was increases in the conditional participation rate that was primarily
responsible for AFDC caseload growth, the analysis here shows that the long-term rise in
expenditures is instead primarily demographic in nature.    These conclusions do not apply to the
Food Stamp and Medicaid programs,  however, where eligibility is more broad-based among
different demographic groups and where programmatic changes as well as changes in
participation rates have dominated demographic influences.
The two periods of growth of U.S. real per capita welfare expenditures illustrate the
nature of the problem facing the fisc.  Expenditure growth occurred in the late 1960s and early
1970s, and then again in the late 1980s and early 1990s.  The period in between was a stable
period in which per capita expenditures grew very little.  Both growth periods were a surprise to
policy makers.  The welfare explosion of the late 1960s and early 1970s was a major event in
welfare policy that had significant political repercussions, and can be plausibly argued to have led
to the reaction of the 1970s in which retrenchment was the norm.  The jump in both rolls and
expenditures in the late 1980s and early 1990s was also unexpected, and once again led to a
reaction that can also be plausibly argued to have contributed to the retrenchment reforms that
have recent occurred.  Whether better forecasting of demographic trends, or other allowances for
uncertainty, can be used in a way to reduce the amplitude of the surprise-reaction-retrenchment
cycle in welfare policy, remains to be seen.31
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Table 1
Expenditures in the Six Largest Welfare Programs in the U.S.,
1994  (millions)
                                                                           Total                  Federal               State-Local
Medicaid $143,593 $82,147 $61,446
Food Stamps  27,396 25,599 1,797
SSI 27,310 23,544 3,766
AFDC 25,920 14,141 11,779
EITC 16,549 16,549 0
Section 8 Low-Income Housing 14,576 14,576 0
Source: Burke (1995, Table 2).35
Table 2
Participation Rates by Demographic Group, 1994-1996 (percent)
Household              
Type                                       AFDC                  Food Stamps                  Medicaid
With Children
  Married 3.8 7.6 5.2
  Female, Never
  Married
49.2 60.0 58.0
  Female, Divorced-            
   Widowed-Sep
23.7 35.1 29.8
  Male, Unmarried 9.8 18.7 10.4
Without Children
  Married 0.6 1.9 2.0
  Female, Never
  Married
5.0 11.3 9.9
  Female, Divorced-            
  Widowed-Sep
4.2 10.2 9.1
  Male, Unmarried 2.5 6.8 5.9
Notes:  Fraction of all U.S. households receiving income in prior year from program in question.
Source: Author's tabulations from pooled 1994, 1995, and 1996 March CPS files.36
Table 3
Changes in Population Shares and AFDC Participation Rates,
1968-1970 to 1994-1996
(Selected groups and income levels)
Household Type
and Nonwelfare         Population Share (%)        Welfare Part. Rate (%)    
Income
   1968-1970  1994-1996     1968-1970   1994-1996
Never Married Women
with Children
     $0 0.15 0.95 88.8 88.0
     $1-$5,000 0.13 1.08 68.9 75.3
     $5,001-$10,000 0.08 0.76 36.2 47.5
Divorced, Widowed, and 
Separated Women with
Children
     $0 0.68 0.73 80.5 83.8
     $1-$5,000 0.99 1.30 57.4 63.4
     $5,001-$10,000 0.90 1.35 26.2 34.7
Unmarried Men 
with Children
     $0 0.02 0.09 50.0 60.3
     $1-$5,000  0.04 0.20  16.7 35.8
     $5,001-$10,000 0.05 0.26 17.1 21.6
Source: Author's tabulation of Current Population Survey files.37
Table 4
Decomposition of Change in Real AFDC Expenditures per Capita, 1968-1970 to 1994-1996
                                                                                                             Weighting Type                                                                          
                                                                   (1)                      (2)                      (3)                      (4)                       (5)                      (6)
Change in Real AFDC 
Expenditures per capita
$14.50 $14.50 $14.50 $14.50 $14.50 $14.50
Components
   Change in Population       
   Share
27.05 27.05 26.76 39.18 38.76 38.76
   Change in Participation    
   Rate
7.65 11.09 7.95 11.09 11.51 7.95
   Change in Expenditures   
   per recipient
-20.20 -23.63 -20.20 -35.76 -35.76 -32.19
Change in Population
Share: Income Strata Only




29.92 29.92 35.57 43.33 51.51 51.51
Source: Author's tabulations from the Current Population Survey38
Table 5
Decompositions of Welfare by Race, and of Food Stamps
and Medicaid
                                                               AFDC, 68-70 to 94-96          Food Stamps,        
Medicaid
                                                             --------------------------------          81-84 to              89-92
to
                                                                  White             Black                  93-96                 93-96
Change in Real Benefits
per capita
$16.9 -$51.8 $15.5 $29.0
Components
    Change in Population      
    Share
20.9 48.3 2.6 5.7
    Change in Participation   
    Rate
9.3 -15.8 7.3 15.8
    Change in Expenditures  
   per recipient
-13.3 -84.2 5.7 7.5
Change in Population




20.7 87.8 9.5 4.6
Notes:  Weighting Method (1) used.
Source: Author's tabulation from Current Population Survey39
Table 6
Projections of Real Per Capita Expenditure to 2050
                                                                                     AFDC      Food Stamps      Medicaid
1993-1996 Per Capita Expenditure $ 82.48 $ 83.48 $ 110.46
Projected 2050 Per Capita Expenditure $ 93.22 $ 93.23 $ 122.83
Source: Author's calculations from Current Population Survey and Bureau of the Census
population projections.Source: Burke (1995, Tables 3 and 7), U.S. Department of Commerce (1996, p.8).
Figure 1
Real Per Capita Expenditures($) on Income-Tested Benefits, and Share of GDP Used for Need-











































































































































)Source: U.S. Social Security Administration (1991, Table 7.E; 1997, Tables 9.G1, 9.H1, 8.E2), U.S. Department of Commerce (1996, p.8).
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MedicaidSource: U.S. Social Security Administration (1991, Table 7.E; 1997, Tables 9.G1, 9.H1, 8.E2), U.S. Department of Commerce (1996, p.8).
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MedicaidSource: Derived from Figure 2 and 3.
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MedicaidSource: U.S. DHHS (1995, p.26, 62), U.S. Department of Commerce (1996, p.8).
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sSource: U.S. DHHS (1995, p.88).
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35-39Source: U.S. DHHS (1995, p.63).
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Not MarriedSource: Author's calculations from Current Population Survey.
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